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On November 11, 1960, a failed coup attempt against President Ngô Đình Diệm of South Vietnam was led by Lieutenant Colonel Vương Văn Đông and Colonel Nguyễn Chánh Thi of the Airborne Division of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). The rebels launched the coup in response to Diệm's autocratic rule and the negative political influence of his brother Ngô Đình Nhu and his sister-in-law Madame Nhu. They also bemoaned the politicisation of the military, whereby regime loyalists who were members of the Ngô family's covert Cần Lao Party were readily promoted ahead of more competent officers who were not insiders. Đông was supported in the conspiracy by his brother-in-law Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Trieu Hong, whose uncle was a prominent official in a minor opposition party. The main link in the coup was Đông's commanding officer Thi, whom he persuaded to join the plot. The coup caught the Ngô family completely off-guard, but was also chaotically executed. The plotters neglected to seal the roads leading into the capital Saigon to seal off loyalist reinforcements, and they hesitated after gaining the initiative. After initially being trapped inside the Independence Palace, Diệm stalled the coup by holding negotiations and promising reforms, such as the inclusion of military officers in the administration. In the meantime, opposition politicians joined the fray, trying to exploit Diệm's position. However, the president's real aim was to buy time for loyalist forces to enter the capital and relieve him. The coup failed when the 5th and 7th Divisions of the ARVN entered Saigon and defeated the rebels. More than four hundred people—many of whom were civilian spectators—were killed in the ensuing battle. These included a group of anti-Diệm civilians who charged across the palace walls at Thi's urging and were cut down by loyalist gunfire. Đông and Thi fled to Cambodia, while Diệm berated the United States for a perceived lack of support during the crisis. Afterwards, Diệm ordered a crackdown, imprisoning numerous anti-government critics and former cabinet ministers. Those that assisted Diệm were duly promoted, while those that did not were demoted. A trial for those implicated in the plot was held in 1963. Seven officers and two civilians were sentenced to death ''in absentia'', while 14 officers and 34 civilians were jailed. Diệm's regime also accused the Americans of sending Central Intelligence Agency members to assist the failed plot. When Diệm was assassinated after a 1963 coup, those jailed after the 1960 revolt were released by the new military junta. == Background == The revolt was led by 28-year-old Lieutenant Colonel Vương Văn Đông,〔 a northerner, who had fought with the French Union forces against the Viet Minh during the First Indochina War. Later trained at Fort Leavenworth in the United States, Đông was regarded by American military advisers as a brilliant tactician and the brightest military prospect of his generation and he served in the Airborne Division.〔 Back in Vietnam, Đông became discontented with Diệm's arbitrary rule and constant meddling in the internal affairs of the army. Diệm promoted officers on loyalty rather than skill, and played senior officers against one another in order to weaken the military leadership and prevent them from challenging his rule. Years after the coup, Đông asserted that his sole objective was to force Diệm to improve the governance of the country.〔 Đông was clandestinely supported by his brother-in-law Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Trieu Hong, the director of training at the Joint General Staff School,〔Dommen, p. 418.〕 and Hong's uncle Hoang Co Thuy.〔 Thuy was a wealthy Saigon-based lawyer,〔Moyar, p. 109.〕 and had been a political activist since World War II. He was the secretary-general of a minority opposition party called the Movement of Struggle for Freedom, which had a small presence in the rubber-stamp National Assembly.〔 Many Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) officers were members of other anti-communist nationalist groups that were opposed to Diệm, such as the Đại Việt Quốc dân đảng (''Nationalist Party of Greater Vietnam'') and the Việt Nam Quốc Dân Đảng (VNQDĐ, ''Vietnamese Nationalist Party''), which were both established before World War II. The VNQDĐ had run a military academy in Yunnan near the Chinese border with the assistance of their nationalist Chinese counterparts, the Kuomintang. Diệm and his family had crushed all alternative anti-communist nationalists, and his politicisation of the army had alienated the servicemen. Officers were promoted on the basis of political allegiance rather than competence, meaning that many VNQDĐ and Đại Việt trained officers were denied such promotions.〔Hammer, pp. 131–133.〕 They felt that politically minded officers, who joined Diệm's secret Catholic-dominated Cần Lao Party, which was used to control South Vietnamese society, were rewarded with promotion rather than those most capable.〔 Planning for the coup had gone on for over a year, with Đông recruiting disgruntled officers. This included his commander, Colonel Nguyễn Chánh Thi. In 1955, Thi had fought for Diệm against the Bình Xuyên organised crime syndicate in the Battle for Saigon. This performance so impressed Diệm—a lifelong bachelor—that he thereafter referred to Thi as "my son".〔〔Halberstam, p. 23.〕 However, the Americans who worked with Thi were less impressed. The CIA described Thi as "an opportunist and a man lacking strong convictions".〔 An American military advisor described Thi as "tough, unscrupulous, and fearless, but dumb".〔 There is some dispute as to whether Thi participated in the coup of his free choice.〔 According to some sources, Thi was still an admirer of Diệm and was forced at gunpoint by Đông and his supporters to join the coup at the last minute, having been kept unaware of the plotting. According to this story, Thi's airborne units were initially moved into position for the coup without his knowledge.〔 Many months before the coup, Đông had met Diệm's brother and adviser Ngô Đình Nhu, widely regarded as the brains of the regime, to ask for reform and de-politicisation of the army. Đông said that the meeting went well and was hopeful that Nhu would enact change.〔 However, a few weeks later, Dong and his collaborators were transferred to different commands and physically separated.〔 Fearing that Diệm and Nhu were trying to throw their plans off balance, they accelerated their planning work, and decided to move on October 6. However, they were then scheduled to go into battle against the communists near Kon Tum in the II Corps in the Central Highlands, forcing a postponement.〔 According to the historian George McTurnan Kahin, Đông was without a command by the time the coup was held.〔 The Americans started to notice and become alarmed at increasing reports of political disillusionment in the military officer corps in August. An intelligence report prepared by the US State Department in late August claimed the "worsening of internal security, the promotion of incompetent officers and Diệm's direct interference in army operations ... his political favoritism, inadequate delegation of authority, and the influence of the Can Lao".〔Kahin, p. 123.〕 It also claimed that discontent with Diệm among high-ranking civil servants was at their highest point since the president had established in power, and that the bureaucrats wanted a change of leadership, through a coup if needed. It was said that Nhu and his wife were the most despised among the civil service.〔 The report predicted that if a coup was to occur, the objective would probably be to force Nhu and his wife out of positions of power and allow Diệm to continue to lead the country with reduced power, should he be willing to do so.〔 The intelligence analysis turned out to be correct.〔Kahin, p. 124.〕 The US Ambassador Elbridge Durbrow, who had been in the post since 1957, had a long record of trying to pressure Diệm into political reforms. He felt that South Vietnam's political problems were due to Diệm's illiberalism and thought the communist insurgency would be more easily defeated if Diệm reached out to a broader cross-section of society, cracked down on corruption, cronyism, abusive public servants, and implemented land reform. However, the South Vietnamese president saw authoritarianism as the solution to political problems and opposition, and the US military hierarchy in Vietnam agreed, leading to frequent disputes between Durbrow and the Military Assistance Advisory Group. Durbrow frequently reported to Washington that Diệm's strong-arm tactics against opposition only created more dissent and opportunities for the communists.〔Kahin, p. 122.〕 Around this time, Durbrow began to advise Diệm to remove Nhu and his wife from the government, basing his arguments on a need to cultivate broad popular support to make South Vietnam more viable in the long term. His key suggestions included Nhu being sent abroad as an ambassador and "altering the nature of the Cần Lao Party".〔 As Nhu and the Can Lao were a core means of his keeping power, Diệm did not follow Durbrow's advice.〔 On September 16, after another fruitless meeting with Diệm, Durbrow reported to Washington: "If Diệm's position in () country continues to deteriorate ... it may become necessary for () US government to begin consideration () alternative courses of action and leaders in order () achieve our objective."〔 In another State Department Report, it was concluded that a coup would become more likely "if Diệm continued to remain uncompromising and if the opposition felt that the United States would not be unsympathetic to a coup or that U.S.-Vietnamese relations would not be seriously damaged."〔 As it turned out those in Vietnam discontented with Diệm reached the same conclusion, that the US would not mind them toppling the president.〔 The coup was organised with the help of some VNQDĐ and Đại Việt members, civilians and officers alike.〔 Đông enlisted the cooperation of an armoured regiment, marine unit and three paratrooper battalions.〔〔 The marine battalion was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Pham Van Lieu.〔 The operation was scheduled to launch on November 11 at 05:00.〔〔 However, the airborne soldiers were not aware of what their officers had in store. They were told that they were heading into the countryside to attack the Viet Cong.〔Moyar, p. 108.〕 Once they were on their way, the officers claimed that the Presidential Guard, who were meant to guard the presidential palace, had mutinied against Diệm.〔 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「1960 South Vietnamese coup attempt」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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